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The U.S.-Japanese Alliance Redefined: 
Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait 
By Vincent Wei-cheng Wang* 
The U.S-Japan alliance was the cornerstone for U.S. strategic 
posture in the Asia-Pacific and the regions peace and' security during the 
Cold War. However, success bred complacency, as alliance became 
adrift. The end of the Cold War, heightened bilateral trade frictions, and 
new security challenges, such as a rising China, a nuclear-armed North 
Korea, and terrorism necessitated a reevaluation of this important 
relationship. 
This article examines the redefined U.S-Japan alliance and 
especially the implications of the 1997 Revised Guidelines for the 
U.S-Japan Defense Cooperation and the 2005 "Two Plus Two" Talks for 
a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait. It will examine the special 
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role that Okinawa plays in the US. security strategy in the region. 
1 
This paper sets out six main arguments: 
(1) The Revised Guidelines for the US-Japan Defense 
Cooperation were prompted by regional security 
challenges in the first half of the 1990s, such as the 
Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait crisis, and 
provided a basis for Japan to play a greater security 
role in and beyond the region. 
(2) The Guidelines established a policy of strategic 
ambiguity by proclaiming its applicability to 
"cooperation in situations in areas surrounding 
Japan " but refusing to specify whether the scope of 
the Guidelines includes or excludes Taiwan. 
(3) In the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency, this 
implies that the US-Japan alliance would serve as 
another option, in addition to U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan and (increasingly) possible US. military 
intervention, as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA). 
(4) Operationally, before the US. completes a major 
realignment of its armed forces in the Asia-Pacific 
region, US. military action on behalf of Taiwan would 
draw heavily from its air and naval assets stationed in 
Okinawa. 
(5) Enhanced US-Japanese military cooperation over 
the Taiwan issue is accompanied by enhanced 
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coordination on "preventive diplomacy" to forestall 
moves by either Taiwan or China to change the status 
quo in the Taiwan Strait. 
(6) In light of the changing regional and global security 
situation, the 2005 Joint Statement of the US-Japan 
Security Consultative Committee (the "2 + 2 Talk'') 
affirms a series of "common strategic objectives, " and 
the first public enunciation that "the peaceful 
resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait 
through dialogue" as a common strategic objective 
signals a coordinated approach to the Taiwan 
contingency. 
(7) US-Japan security alliance at this point seems 
distracted by such pressing matters as the war on 
terror and the Iraqi war. But its future viability 
depends on a reflection on such long-term and 
fundamental developments as China s rise. 
Keywords: U.S.-Japan alliance, Revised Guidelines of Japan-U.S. 
Defense Cooperation, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative 
Committee, the "2+2 Talk," Taiwan Strait, Okinawa, 
Taiwan Relations Act, China, areas surrounding Japan, 
East Asian security 
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INTRODUCTION: AN ALLIANCE THROUGH THE TEST OF TIME 
Until the recent ascendancy of China in regional and world affairs 
in the post-Cold War era, 1 it had been almost axiomatic for many to view 
the U.S.-Japan relations as the most important bilateral relationship in 
East Asia. The adage offered by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike 
Mansfield in the 1970s - "The U.S.-Japanese relationship is the most 
important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none"2 - is widely 
considered received wisdom. 
This important relationship was anchored on a strong but also 
unequal alliance forged in 194 7. The alliance was structured as a grand 
"strategic bargain," under which the U.S. solved Japan's security 
problems by essentially providing extended deterrence over Japan, thus 
allowing Japan to forego military buildup and instead concentrate on 
economic development as the route to national salvation (this is known as 
the Yoshida Doctrine3); it also served to mitigate the security dilemmas 
that would have surfaced within the region if Japan had been able to 
rearm. 
4 
1 For a good collection of articles from International Security dealing with the 
implications of a rising China, see Michael E. Brown, ed., The Rise of China (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2000). For a more recent debate, see Robert Sutter, China's Rise in 
Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 
2 Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1997): 363. 
3 Michael Armacost, Friends or Rivals? The Insiders Account of U.S.-Japan Relations 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 77. 
4 For more discussions on this concept, see G. John Ikenberry, "America in East Asia: 
Power, Markets, and Grand Strategy," in Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel, eds., Beyond 
Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2004): 37-54, and Christopher W. Hughes and Akiko Fukushima, 
"U.S.-Japan Security Relations - Toward Bilateralism Plus?" in Krauss and Pempel, 
Beyond Bilateralism: 55-86. 
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Instead of the classical balance of power system or the 
NATO-style regional collective security organization, 5 East Asian 
security during the Cold War was buttressed by a "hub-and-spoke" 
alliance system,6 under which the U.S. maintained a series of bilateral 
alliances, the most important of which undoubtedly was the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, and the forward deployment of U.S. troops. The bulk of U.S. 
troops in Japan were stationed in Okinawa. 
For more than a half century, the U.S.-Japan alliance has served as 
the bedrock for peace and prosperity in East Asia.7 Japan was secured 
from threats to· its security (possible. Soviet attack), and the country has 
grown to become an economic giant. The public good provided by- the 
U.S.-Japan alliance- peace and stability- provided a stable international 
environment which enabled many nations in the Asia-Pacific region to 
industrialize and become prosperous. Japan's prosperity thus depended 
on regional stability, and Japan's security contributed to regional 
prosperity. 
However, although having "won" the Cold War, this bilateral 
relationship began to drift} and in some cases deteriorate, in the first half 
of the 1990s. A multitude of factors contributed to it: perception of 
5 For an account on why NATO-like regional security organization failed to emerge in 
East Asia, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. 
Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., East Asian Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1996): 3-31. 
6 Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, Jr., "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing 
Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 1 (Summer 
2001): 7-17 
7 Balbina Y. Hwang, "A New Security Agenda for the U.S.-Japan Alliance," The 
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, no. 1749 (26 April 2004): 6. 
8 Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). 
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decreased regional security threats, increasing trade frictions, bureaucratic 
inattention, and public fatigue. It was not until the 1995 Nye Initiative_ 
that this trend was reversed. The report, 9 written by a commission 
headed by Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense of the First Clinton 
Administration and presently Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard 
University, provided a critical intellectual and policy rationale for the 
continuance of the U.S. leadership role in the region and for a reenergized 
and redefined alliance. 
Subsequent developments, such as the North Korean crisis, the 
1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the rise of China, and the post-September 11 
war oil terror (Operation Enduring Freedom), gave further impetuses for 
redefining the U.S.-Japan alliance for the post-Cold War era. 10 The 
alliance has proved capable of adjusting to the evol¥ing regional and 
international security. 11 However, the future of the alliance has also been 
a subject of recurrent debate. 
This paper examines the rationales and substance of the redefined 
U.S.-Japan alliance. In particular, it focuses on the implications of the 
1997 Revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the 
2005 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee 
(the "2+2 Talk") for regional security issues, particularly a contingency in 
the Taiwan Strait. It will examine the special role that Okinawa plays in 
9 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific 
Region (February 1995). 
10 See Hwang, "A New Security Agenda," and Mike M. Mochizuki, "Terms of 
Engagement: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Rise of China," in Krauss and Pempel, 
Beyond Bilateralism: 87-114. 
11 Balbina Y. Hwang, "The U.S.-Japan Ministerial Talks: Focus on a New Security 
Relationship," The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, no. 960 (17 February 
2005). 
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the U.S. security strategy in the region. This paper's main arguments are 
highlighted at the outset: 
(8) The Revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation 
were prompted by regional security challenges in the first half of 
the 1990s, such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait 
crisis, and provided a basis for Japan to play a greater security 
role in and beyond the region. 
(9) The Guidelines established a policy of strategic ambiguity by 
proclaiming its applicability to "cooperation in situations in areas 
surrounding Japan" but refusing to specify whether the scope of 
the Guidelines includes or excludes Taiwan. 
(1 0) In the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency, this implies that the 
U.S.-Japan alliance would serve as another option, in addition to 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and (increasingly) possible U.S. 
military intervention, as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA). 
(11) Operationally, before the U.S. completes a major realignment of 
its armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. military action on 
behalf of Taiwan would draw heavily from its air and naval assets 
stationed in Okinawa. 
(12) Enhanced U.S.-Japanese military cooperation over the Taiwan 
issue is accompanied by enhanced coordination on "preventive 
diplomacy" to forestall moves by either Taiwan or China to 
change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 
(13) U.S.-Japan security alliance at this point seems distracted 
by such pressing matters as the war on terror and the Iraqi . 
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war. But its future viability depends on a reflection on 
such long-term and fundamental developments as China's 
rise. 
(14) In light of the changing regional and global security 
situation, the Joint Statement affirms a series of "common 
strategic objectives," and the first public enunciation that 
"the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan 
Strait through dialogue" as a common strategic objective 
signals a coordinated approach to the Taiwan contingency. 
This paper first examines the evolution of U.S.-Japanese alliance 
during the Cold War. It then looks at the special role (and burden) 
played by Okinawa in this alliance. It then discusses the Revised 
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation and the Joint Statement of the 
Security Consultative Committee to underscore the geostrategic rationales 
for a revamped alliance for a post-Cold War Asia. It ends with 
discussions of the Guidelines' and the Joint Statement's implications for 
security in the Taiwan Strait. 
U.S.-JAPANESE ALLIANCE DURING THE COLD WAR 
During the Cold War, the U.S.-Japanese security relationship went 
through three distinct phases. 12 The first period began with the Imperial 
Japan's surrender in 1945 and enqed with the outbreak ofthe Korean War 
in 1950. During this period, the American occupation forces ruled Japan 
12 This chronological classification follows Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "The Revised 
U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines: Implications for Beijing and Taipei," Issues and Studies, 
vol. 34, no. 4 (Aprill998): 72-89. 
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and drafted a constitution that paved the way for a fundamental 
transformation of the Japanese state by achieving two main goals -the 
demilitarization and democratization of Japan. 13 
The most famous clause of the 1947 Constitution was Article 9: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as 
means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, 
land, -sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will 
never be rnaintained. 14 
Under this provision, Japan possessed no armed forces. American 
military occupation both guaranteed Japan's security and ensured that 
Japan would not rearm. 
The second phase in U.S.-Japanese security relations during the Cold 
War lasted from 1950 to 1960. As American occupation forces were 
deployed to fight in Korea, they were replaced by the Japanese Police 
Reserve Force- a unit that evolved ultimately into the Self-Defense Force 
(SDF). American military occupation formally carne to an end during 
this period. The two countries signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 
1951 and a highly unequal Mutual Security Treaty in 1952. In the words 
13 For a recent provocative account which argues that modem Japan, including what 
most of the U.S. criticizes in Japan's behavior, stems directly from U.S. policy in the 
1950s - a period when the U.S. occupation forces wielded enormous influence on 
Japanese public life, see Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan 
·. Since the Occupation (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
14 LaFeber, The Clash: 268. 
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of an analyst: 
In addition to granting bases to Japan to the United States, 
it gave the U.S. a veto over any third country's military 
presence in Japan, the right to project military power from 
bases in Japan, and an indefinite time period for the treaty. 
In addition, the U.S. insisted on the extraterritorial legal 
rights for its military and dependents. 15 
Japan remained an American military protectorate and Okinawa 
remained under American military occupation. The Korean War offered 
Japan opportunities to gain more political and economic independence. 
LaFeber thus concludes: "The Korean War was to the rebuilding of Japan 
as the Marshall Plan was for rebuilding Western Europe."16 
The third phase was marked by the signing of a revised bilateral 
defense treaty in 1960. Although the new treaty triggered the largest 
demonstrations in Japanese history, both countries clearly benefited from 
the new defense arrangement. The U.S. successfully integrated Japan 
politically, economically, and strategically into its · global campaign to 
contain the spread of communism. The "nuclear umbrellas" enabled 
Japan to hold its defense budget to roughly one percent of its GNP for 
almost three decades- a figure that led critics to argue that Japan enjoyed 
a "free ride" for its own security. 
Unlike the old treaty, the 1960 treaty explicitly committed the U.S. 
to defend Japan, and to consult with the Japanese before putting forces 
into action under the pact's provisions. The treaty had a ten-year 
15 Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era 
(Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1992): 27. 
16 LaFeber, The Clash: 294. 
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duration. Under Article 6, The U.S. retained basing privileges on 
Japanese soil, which proved critical as a staging ground and workshop for 
U.S. forces during the Vietnam War. 
The most controversial aspect of the treaty was its application when 
"the security of the Far East is threatened." As a precursor to the 
controversy over the 1997 revised defense guidelines (to be discussed 
later), critics quickly challenged if "the Far East" phrase meant that 
Japanese would be obligated to help the American fight a war against 
China over Taiwan. In the Diet on 26 February 1960, Prime Minster 
Kishi Nobusuke gave in to U.S. views by defining the "Far East" 
provision as including "primarily the region north of the Philippines 
inclusive, as well as Japan and its surrounding area, including the 
Republic of Korea and the area under the control of the Republic of China 
[Taiwan]." 17 Nevertheless, a diplomatic euphemism, "Far East," was 
used. 
The formation of the SDF and the revision of the security treaty to 
include "the Far East" raised questions about whether Japan had _gradually 
moved away from Article 9 - the so-called Peace Constitution. Many 
analysts make a key distinction: What the Japanese renounced in Article 9 
of the 194 7 Constitution was "the right of belligerency." However, 
Japan, being a member of the United Nations, clearly recognizes "the 
right of collective self-defense" authorized -by Article 51 of the UN 
Charter and acknowledged in Article 5 of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty 
and the preamble of the 1960 revision of the security treaty.18 Therefore, 
17 LaFeber, The Clash: 320. 
18 David Asher, "Could Japan Become the England of the Far East"? American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Papers and Studies, June 2001, 
<http://www.aei.org/ps/psasher.htm>, p. 2 [accessed 2 July 2001]. 
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Japan, a nation that imports over 85% of its oil from the Middles East and 
whose export and investment interests span the globe, is legally permitted 
and prudentially justified to possess sufficient military capabilities for 
defending itself and its interests closer to home. 
Throughout the Cold War, Japan barred its SDF from participating in 
operations outside of Japanese territory. This annoyed some American 
military planners. However, Japan played a valuable part by serving as a 
forward base of the U.S. military in Asia. The two allies frequently 
conducted joint exercises. In 1978 they signed an agreement -- the 
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation-- to establish procedures 
to follow in the event of a Soviet attack. 19 
It should be pointed out that mainly as a result of its spectacular 
economic growth during the Cold War, Japan, by the 1980s, was paying 
for a substantial portion of the costs associated with the stationing of 
American troops in Japan. In addition, its defense budget, though 
capped at the symbolically important one percent, had grown steadily - a 
trend that has accelerated in the post-Cold War era. · Japan now boasts 
one of the world's largest defense budgets (see Tables 1 and 2). 
According to the figures provided by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), as of 2003, Japan's military expenditure was $42.5 billion (the 
fifth largest in the world). As comparison, the U.S.'s was $370.7 billion 
(the world's largest), and China's was estimated at $60.0 billion (second 
largest). 20 
19 For a complete text of the 1978 "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," see 
Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan: Response to a New Era (Tokyo, July 1966): 
305-9. 
2° Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2004. 
http://www.odci.gov/cialpublications/factbook/rankorder/2067rank.html 
March 2005]. 
Available at 
[accessed 1 
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(Tables 1-3 about here) 
In fact, as Table 3 shows, the Japanese SDF is a force to be reckoned 
with. Many consider it the most technologically sophisticated 
non-nuclear force in the Asia-Pacific. 
In sum, the U.S.-Japanese alliance during the Cold War had been 
pivotal for maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, 
helping Japan transform into an economic giant, and promoting U.S. 
interests. However, this success was achieved with one notable 
drawback: the special role played by, or burden on, Okinawa - home of 
the bulk of' American troops stationed in Japan and Japan's poorest 
prefecture. 
OKINAWA: CHECKERED HISTORY AND UNEVEN BURDEN 
Discussions on Okinawa's role in East Asian security and its future 
require a few preliminary words on its history and an understanding of the 
part it has played in U.S.-Japanese relations. 
What commentators usually call "Okinawa" refers to. the 
southernmost and poorest prefecture (ken) of Japan. The prefecture is 
composed of the Ryukyu Islands - an archipelago of 55 islands with a 
total land area of 870 square miles (2,254 square km) extending almost 
400 miles (650 km) southwest from Kyushu, southern Japan, to the 
northern tip of Taiwan bordering the Philippine Sea (east) and the East 
China Sea (west). The prefecture has a population of close to 1.3 million 
inhabitants.21 
21 Information compiled from "Ryukyu Islands," Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 
<http://search.eb.com/bol/topic?eu=66236&sctn=l> [Accessed 23 March 2002]. 
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Once an independent kingdom, the Ryukyus had historically been 
subjected to Japanese and Chinese cultural and political influence. It 
became a Japanese prefecture in 1879 during the early part of the Meiji 
era (1868-1912).22 
During World War II, the Okinawa Island ( 463 square miles or 1,199 
square km), the largest in the Ryukyu Islands archipelago, was the site of 
one of the bloodiest campaigns in the Pacific theatre.23 
After the defeat of Japan in World War II, the United States military 
took control of the Ryukyu Islands. In 1951 a civil administration, 
headed by a chief executive appointed by the U.S. commissioner and 
based in Naha, the islands' capital and largest city, replaced the military 
government. The chief executive was elected by the legislature in 1966, 
and two years later his election was made popular.24 
In 1972 the United States returned Okinawa to Japanese control. 
However, the Japanese regained only administrative control of Okinawa. 
Under the deal struck during the 1969 summit meeting between President 
Richard Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, as 
compensation, the United States received use of the bases, in the words of 
the eminent historian Walter LaFeber, "in language so loose that Nixon 
22Information compiled from "Okinawa," Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 
<http://search.eb.com/boVtopic?eu=58347&sctn=l> [Accessed 23 March 2002]. 
23 InApril1945 U.S. troops made an amphibious landing in Okinawa, which was 
heavily defended by the Japanese. In the ensuing three-month-long campaign, U.S. 
forces sustained about 12,000 dead and 36,000 wounded before they were able to 
establish complete control of the island. The Japanese casualties were over 100,000 
dead. The invasion of Okinawa was the largest amphibious operation mounted by the 
Americans in the Pacific war and resulted in the beginning of the end of the Japanese 
Empire. See "Okinawa" in note 2 and "World War II," Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 
<http://search.eb.com/boVtopic?eu=118868&sctn=25> [Accessed 23 March 2002]. 
24 
"Ryukyu Islands," note 21. 
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retained the power to use them for launching nuclear attacks. "25 
Critics argue that since the end of World War II Okinawa has 
received a disproportionate share of the burden for maintaining 
U.S.-Japanese security relati.onship and implementing America's military 
strategy in Asia. Constituting only 0.6% of Japan's total land area, 
Okinawa houses 75% of the U.S. troops stationed in Japan on 39 bases -
one ofthe largest concentration of U.S. forces anywhere in the world.Z6 
Okinawa is considered the "linchpin" of American military strategy 
in Asia and is a key nexus of the approximately 100,000 forward deployed 
U.S. troops in the Asia-Pacific region. Table 4 shows the distribution of 
the Pentagon's latest data on active duty personnel deployed overseas.Z7 
(Table 4 about here) 
Table 4 shows that among the 1.38 million total active military 
personnel, 18.6% are stationed outside the United States and its territories, 
whereas 81.4% are stationed on the U.S. and its territories. Among the 
American troops stationed overseas, 45.5% are in Europe and 39.3% are 
in East Asia and Pacific - clearly indicating these two regions' strategic 
25 LaFeber, The Clash: 350. 
26 Tim Shorrock, "Okinawa and the U.S. Military in Northeast Asia," Foreign Policy in 
Focus, Vol. 5, No. 22 (July 2000), obtained from the internet 
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/. The U.S. troops stationed in Japan reached a 
high of 63,000- the figure cited by Shorrock. The more recent figures are: There are 
around 48,000 American military personnel (apparently including dependents) in Japan, 
and 25,000 of them are stationed in Okinawa. "More Okinawans Accept U.S. Military 
Bases- Poll," Reuters, 20 May 2001, 
http://dailvnews.yahoo.com/htx/nm/20010520/wlljapan usa de 2.html [accessed 20 
May2001]. 
27 Data in Table 4 were as of September 20, 2000. More recent data about troop 
deployments are no longer available from the Department of Defense's website, perhaps 
due to significant movement of troops to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq and heightened 
concerns about the safety of American troops abroad. 
L_ -
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importance to the U.S. (compared to Sub.:.SaharanAfrica's 0.1%). 
The importance of Asia-Pacific for U.S. military planning purpose_s 
is clearly underscored in the Pentagon's 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) -- the Defense Department's major high-level strategic 
planning document. The report says that with Europe largely at peace, 
"Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military 
competition." It noted the possibility that "a military competitor with a 
formidable resource base will emerge in the region (the East Asian 
littoral)."28 Many suspect this implies China. The report echoed the 
conclusion of a February 2001 study by the Pentagon's Office of Net 
Assessment (ONA) and its director Andrew Marshall, which "cast the 
Pacific as the most important region for military planners." 29 A 
subsequent study by the ONA reiterated that "long-term trends -political, 
economic, and military - indicate that the primary security challenges the 
United States will face in the first decades of the 21st century will come 
from Asia."30 In this context, the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
only increases. 
The most recent available data (as of 30 September 2000) shows that 
among the 101,447 stationed in East Asia and the Pacific, 40,159 (or 40%) 
are stationed in Japan, 36,565 (or 36%) are stationed in South Korea, and 
another 23,352 (or 23%) are "afloat"- mainly naval personnel on ships. 
28 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 4. 
29 Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon Review Puts Emphasis on Long-Range Arms in 
Pacific," The New York Times ( 17 May 2001 ), A 1. 
30 
"Focusing the Department of Defense on Asia," project for the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, Director for Net Assessments (Washington, DC: DFI International, 30 
September 2001); cited in Aaron L. Friedberg, "United States," in Ellings and Friedberg, 
Strategic Asia 2002-03, 20. 
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This confirms the conventional wisdom on the importance of these two 
Asian allies to the U.S. 
However, a further scrutiny of the country distribution by service 
reveals a case for troop rationalization in light of how war may be fought 
in the future, rather than was fought in the past: More than 95% of the U.S. 
marines in East Asia and the Pacific are in Japan (with a majority of them 
on Okinawa); however, a Normandy-type of amphibious invasion does 
not appear a likely strategy in future contingencies in the region. By 
contrast, 94% of the U.S. army personnel in the region are stationed in 
South Korea, evidently positioned as a "tripwire" to cope with a probable 
land-originated contingency (North Korea). In addition, 60% and 39% 
of the U.S. air force personnel are deployed in Japan and South Korea, 
respectively. 31 
These data corroborate the conventional view that the U.S. strategic 
posture in East Asia-Pacific is anchored on America's bilateral security 
treaties with Japan and South Korea and bolstered by the more than 
100,000 forward deployed troops in the theatre, with the lions' shares 
going to Japan and South Korea. 
However, U.S. troops in Japan, for the defense of Japan and 
maintaining regional security, are disproportionately concentrated on 
Okinawa. 
Chalmers Johnson, the founder of Japan Policy Research Institute 
31 All percentages are calculated from data in Table 1, see U.S. Department of Defense, 
Defense Almanac, "Active Duty Military personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by 
Country." <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanac/people/serve.html> 
[Accessed 2 March 2002]. 
I 
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and a former professor at University of California, Berkeley, is one of the 
most vocal critics of American-Japanese complicity toward Okinawa. 
He points out that the American bases in Okinawa together take up an 
estimated 20% of the prime agricultural land in the central and southern 
parts of the main island of Okinawa, while contributing, directly or 
indirectly, to only about 5% of the gross domestic product of the 
prefecture. 32 Meanwhile, Japan's "host nation support," around $5 
billion a year, is the most generous of all. It supplied 78% of the costs of 
U.S. troops on its soi1.33 
Calling Okinawa "a cold war island,"34 Johnson put it this way: 
"The Japanese government has so far been successful in making Okinawa, 
the most reinote prefecture, serve as the 'garbage dump' of the 
[U.S.-Japanese] Security Treaty."35 
Nevertheless, most of the mainstream analysts favor the status quo 
and oppose the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Okinawa, although 
some would accept a case for reduction or rationalization of troops. Ezra 
F. Vogel, a Japan scholar at Harvard and a former CIA national 
intelligence officer on Japan, predicts the continuation of the status quo 
by all involved. He argues that Japan will continue paying the support 
32 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Cost and Consequences of American Empire (New 
York: Metropolitan Books, 2000): 36 and 51. 
33 Johnson, Blowback: 55. Johnson cites a list introduced by the Japanese Defense 
Facilities Administration Agency to the Upper House of the Diet on 26 March 1998, 
which enumerated 1,472 services for the U.S. troops, paid for by the Japanese 
government Chalmers Johnson, "Military Colonialism in Okinawa," Viewpoints, 
<http://www.aasianst.orgNiewpoints/johnson.htm> [accessed 10 July 2001]. 
34 Chalmers Johnson, ed., Okinawa: Cold War Island (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy 
Research Institute, 1999). 
35 Johnson, Blowback: 41. 
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for the housing of U.S. troops in Okinawa and elsewhere because the 
alternatives to a security pact with the U.S.- developing an independent 
military capacity to defend itself or engaging in unarmed neutrality - are 
less attractive. He is also confident that Okinawans will see the 
economic benefit by providing facilities to U.S. troops in exchange for 
economic aid from Tokyo. He also disputes the proposal for maintaining 
U.S.-Japanese treaty. but pulling out U.S. troops - so-called "alliance 
without U.S. bases" or "ala carte" security relationship?6 "Ifthe U.S. is 
to respond quickly to emergencies in places like the Korean peninsula it 
needs to have troops and supplies ready on hand," argues Voge1.37 Not 
having troops in Japan would also undermine the credibility of America's 
willingness to defend Japan. 
During the Cold War, American bases in Okinawa provided a crucial 
staging platform for the projection of American power and rear area 
support. Even Johnson admits, "America's two major wars against 
Asian communism - in Korea and Vietnam - could not have been fought 
without bases on Japanese territory."38 
Indeed, the arrangement of U.S.-Japanese security relationship, 
which calls for the U.S. to station troops in Japan {to both protect and 
contain Japan) and for Japan, free from military burden, to concentrate on 
economic development, has proved to be satisfactory to all involved. 
Kurt Campbell, a former Pentagon official in the Clinton Administration 
and presently Senior Vice President of the Center of Strategic and 
36 Shunji Taoka, "The Japanese-American Security Treaty Without a U.S. Military 
Presence," in Johnson, Okinawa: 235-245. 
37 Ezra F. Vogel, "The Case for U.S. Troops in Okinawa," Viewpoints 
<http://www.aasianst.org/Viewpoints/Vogel.htm> [Accessed 10 July 2001]. 
38 Johnson, Blowback: 39. 
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International Studies (CSIS), puts it this way: 
The United States would take care of Japan's security, 
and Japan, in tum, would not ask any questions. The 
reality was and is that, for much of the U.S. national 
security apparatus, nothing could be more comfortable than 
an ally that provides bases, generous host-nation support, 
and does not want to be consulted. 39 
However, Campbell laments that this alliance that "has provided the 
bedrock for U.S. policy in Asia and has been a mainstay, preserving peace 
and stability for nearly half a century," does not get the attention or 
recognition it deserves.40 In fact, it had shifted into an "auto-pilot" mode 
or had become a "forgotten alliance." The end of the Cold War 
necessitated an update of this important relationship. 
U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
Although Japan had played a vital role in America's containment 
policy during the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end 
of the Cold War called into question the viability of the U.S.-Japan 
security pact. The first half of the 1990s saw the relationship deteriorate 
and adrift mainly as a result of decreased perception of regional security 
threat, increasing trade frictions, and bureaucratic inertia or inattention. 
39 Kurt M. Campbell, "Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership," The Washingtoh 
Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Autumn 2000): 126. 
4° Campbell, "Energizing,": 125. 
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Japanese domestic support for U.S.-Japan security in general, and U.S. 
bases on Japan in particular, continued to decline. 
Amidst these developments and the facts that the last time the 
guidelines were discussed was in 1978, much had changed since then, and 
that the U.S.-Japanese alliance was never really invoked during the Cold 
War, many in the U.S. and Japan stressed the importance of improving 
both the operative and the political credibility of the alliance. 
For instance, Michael J. Green, a Japan analyst and presently the 
National Security Council's Senior Director on Asian Affairs, argued in 
1998, "As long as U.S. forward ~engagement remained credible, it is 
unlikely Japan would choose neutrality or appeasement if Beijing 
challenged U.S. hegemony."41 Mike M. Mochizuki, a Japan scholar at 
George Washington University, also asserted, "As long as China's 
growing military power can be balanced by a robust U.S.-Japan 
· alliance .. .in a Sino-American military confrontation over Taiwan ... Japan 
has no choice but to support the U.S."42 
Green's and Mochizuki's admonitions followed the basic premises of 
the 1995 document, United States Security Strategy for the East 
Asia-Pacific Region, authored by Joseph Nye (dubbed the Nye 
Initiative ).43 The Nye Initiative arrested further erosion of bilateral 
security ties and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to "maintain a stable 
41 Michael J. Green, "Interests, Asymmetries, and Strategic Choices," in Michael J. 
Green and Mike M. Mochizuki, The U.S-Japan Security Alliance in the 2JSI Century 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998): 15. 
42 Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japanese Security Policy," in Green and Mochizuki, The 
U.S-Japan Security Alliance: 32. 
·. 
43 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific 
Region (February 1995). 
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forward presence in the region at the existing level of about 100,000 
troops, for the foreseeable future." 44 The report described the_ U.S. 
presence as "oxygen." "Security is like oxygen: you don't tend to notice 
until you begin to lose it. "45 
Symbolizing a paradigmatic shift, The Nye Initiative represented the 
increasing awareness of the need to update, refocus, and recommit the 
U.S.-Japanese alliance. 
Two incidents in the early 1990s underscored the kinds of limitations 
of the alliance that the Nye Initiative sought to rectify. In the 1990-1 
Persian Gulf War, even though it contributed billions of dollars to finance 
the war, Japan's strict interpretation of the 1947 Constitution prevented it 
from joining the allied coalition, which was deeply disappointing to those 
American critics who hoped that the Japanese SDF would play a more 
active peacekeeping role. In the showdown with North Korea over its 
nuclear program in 1994, Pentagon officials were thus unsure about the 
level of support they could secure from Tokyo. 
Then in 1995-6, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
conducted a series of war games and missile tests aftermath of Taiwan 
President Lee Teng-hui's visit to his American alma mater, Cornell 
University. The Chinese saber-rattling culminated in March 1996, when 
Taiwan held its first democratic presidential election. The crisis was 
defused when the Clinton Administration dispatched the aircraft c·arrier 
battle group, USS Independence, from Okinawa to waters off Taiwan, to 
be joined by another carrier battle group from the Mediterranean. 
44 For more details on the Nye Initiative, see two good sources: Yoichi Funabashi, 
Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), chapter 12, and David 
Asher, "A U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century," Orbis (summer 1997): 343-374. 
45 United States Security Strategy: l. 
The U.S.-Japanese Alliance Redefined: 
Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait 23 
The Taiwan Strait Crisis gave American and Japanese leaders the 
clarion call to strengthen bilateral security ties. U.S. President Bill 
Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro met on 17 April 
1996 in Tokyo -- shortly after the Taiwan elections. They issued a Joint 
U.S.-Japan Declaration on Security, in which they agreed to revise the 
1978 framework for defense cooperation. 
The new defense guideline, The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense 
Cooperation, issued on 23 September 1997, was hailed by Kurt Campbell 
as "the Asian corollary of NATO expansion."46 
THE REVISED GUIDELINES FOR U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION47 
The drafting of the Guidelines was a careful balancing act. Ichiro 
Fujisaki, the Political Minister of the Japanese Embassy explained the 
three major principles used in the drafting. To assuage possible concerns 
·of other countries in the region (like China) and a skeptical domestic 
public that the Guidelines were strictly within the Constitution and are not 
targeted at any third country, the Guidelines followed· three basic 
principles: 
• The rights and obligations under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental 
framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, will remain unchanged. 
• Japan will conduct its actions within the limitation of its 
Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the 
46 Campbell, "Energizing." 
47 For the full text, see Green and Mochizuki, The US.-Japan Security Alliance: 57-72; 
and Ministry ofF oreign Affairs of Japan, "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation," at www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-americalus/securitv/guideline2.html 
[accessed 1_3 May 2004]. 
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maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its 
three non-nuclear principles. 
• All actions taken by the U.S. and Japan will be consistent with 
basic principles of international law, including the peaceful 
settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant 
international agreements such as the Charter of the United 
Nations.48 
In addition, there was a fourth clause in the section that also 
seemed aimed at allaying concerns: 
The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not 
obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary, or 
administrative measures. However, since the objective of the 
Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an 
effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two 
Governments are expected to reflect in appropriate way the results 
of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific 
policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be 
consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.49 
Sections Ill, IV, and V of the Guidelines discussed how the U.S. 
and Japan would cooperate under three different scenarios: (1) under 
normal circumstances, (2) actions in response to an armed attack 
against Japan, and (3) cooperation in situations in areas surrounding 
Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and 
48 These three principles form the first three clauses of Part II of the Guidelines: Basic 
Premises and Principles, see Green and Mochizuki: 57 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
"The Guidelines." 
49 Ibid. 
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security (situations in areas surrounding Japan). Under the new 
Guidelines, the scope of Japanese SDF's role in dealing with regional 
hostilities was greatly expanded: 
• Japanese naval vessels may participate in blockades against other 
nations in support of internationally recognized sanctions. 
• They can engage in minesweeping, surveillance, and search and 
rescue activities in Japanese or international waters. 
• Japan will allow U.S. forces to use civilian harbors and bases 
during a crisis. 
• Japan will supply food and fuel to American naval vessels during a 
CDSlS. 
• The two countries will increase the sharing of intelligence and 
coordination of response if hostilities in the region appear 
imminent. 
• Japan will help evacuate civilians trapped in unstable countries 
Arguably the most significant and controversial aspect of the new 
defense pact is its provision for joint military cooperation on "situations in 
areas surrounding Japan." Michael Green argued, "The 1997 Guidelines 
filled in the gaps from the third part of the 1978 Guidelines." 50 
According to this view, the 1997 Guidelines apply to "situations in areas 
surrounding Japan" because such contingencies will have an important 
influence on Japan's peace and security. The Guidelines takes pain to 
explain that the concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not 
50 Green and Mochizuki: 75. 
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geographical but situational. It also reqmres that that "the two 
Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to 
prevent such situations from occurring." 
In other words, the Guidelines calls for both enhanced mutual 
cooperation on regional security challenges and coordination on 
preventive diplomacy - that is, it calls for a stronger alliance during 
peacetime and war. 
The phrase, "areas surrounding Japan," appears another masterful 
diplomatic euphemism. At a practical level, most analysts agree that it 
includes the Korean Peninsula. After all, it was the 1994 Korean nuclear 
crisis that provided an impetus for the revision of the Guidelines. 
However, the phrase might also apply to other areas - including the 
Taiwan Strait. Green thinks that the artful handling of this delicate 
issue - neither to explicitly include nor to explicitly exclude Taiwan from 
the defense perimeter- is just right: 
Taiwan could not have been excluded, because the 
implication would be that the U.S. and Japan do not care 
what happens in the area around Taiwan, which is not true. 
On the other hand, if Taiwan had been included explicitly, 
China would be provoked unnecessarily, and Taiwan would 
be stimulated unnecessarily.51 
This policy of "strategic ambiguity" seeks to preserve maximum 
policy flexibility and exert dual deterrence - defeating China's military 
attack against Taiwan and dissuading Taiwan's declaration of de jure 
independence. Prime Minister Hashimoto never stated Taiwan would be 
51 Green and Mochizuki: 75. 
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included or excluded from the scope of the guidelines. However, tired of 
the PRC's incessant .probing and lack of appreciation for Japan's 
self-restraint, Seiroku Kajiyama, Chief Cabinet Secretary, said that the 
new guidelines would "naturally cover" a military conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait. 52 
The Japanese restraint shown in its penchant for diplomatic 
euphemism reflected its ambivalence about assuming a greater regional or 
global security role and its desire to avoid angering China. However, 
thanks to a series of developments in the past decade, Japan jettisoned its 
reticence and began to be more willing to support the U.S. The most 
dramatic turnaround is exemplified by the February 2005 "2+2 talks" 
between the two countries' foreign and defense ministers. 
JOINT STATEMENT OF THE SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE 
·On 19 February 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Condolezza Rice and 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met with their Japanese 
counterparts and issued a landmark joint statement.53 After assessing the 
security situation facing the U.S. and Japan and reviewing the alliance, 
the statement declared a number of "common strategic objectives" in the 
region and globally. It affirms the importance of maintaining the 
capability to address contingencies affecting the U.S. and Japan. It 
supports the peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea and 
encourages "the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait 
through dialogue." While it welcomes China to play a responsible and 
52 Nicholas Kristof, "For Japan, A Quandary on Pleasing Two Giants," The New York 
Times (24 August 1997): A9. 
53 . 
The text can be found at the State Department's website 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa!ors/ps/2005/42490.htm [accessed 19 February 2005]. 
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constructive role regionally and globally, it also calls on China to 
"improve transparency in its military affairs." 
This marks the first time that the U.S. and Japan explicitly identifies 
Taiwan as a mutual security concern. In the past, the two had relied on 
euphemisms like "Far East" and "areas surrounding Japan" partly to defer 
to China. Analysts thus called the move a demonstration of Japan's 
willingness to confront the rapidly growing might of China. 54 
Thanks to its rapid economic growth (averaging 9.5% per year in the 
1990s), China has had double-digit increases inits military spending year 
after year since the early 1990s. The CIA currently estimates that China 
has the second highest military spending in the world- only after the U.S. 
China's economic strength has enabled China to rapidly modernize its 
military and dramatically expand its influence in Asia. Under the new 
good-neighbor policy of "peaceful rise," China signed an agreement with 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2002 to establish a 
full free trade agreement (FTA) between them by 2010-15, while offering 
the poorer ASEAN nations "early harvest" in China's domestic market.55 
China's trade offensive had outsmarted Japan in the region which has 
traditionally been beholden to its aid and investment. 
surpassed the U.S. as Japan's largest trading partne~. 
Last year, China 
Chinese drilling 
54 Anthony Faiola, "Japan to Join U.S. Policy on Taiwan," Washington Post (18 
February 2005): Al; Ching Cheong, "U.S., Japan United on Taiwan," The Strait Times 
(20 February 2005)[through Lexis-Nexis]. 
55 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "The Logic of China-ASEAN FTA: Economic Statecraft of 
'Peaceful Ascendancy,'" in China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional 
Challenges, Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C Y Ku, eds., pp. 17-41 (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies and Kaohsiung: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, National 
Sun Yat-sen University, 2005). 
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last fall in an area claimed by Japan and a Chinese submarine caught in 
November trying to slip through Japanese territorial waters added to 
Japan's sense ofvulnerability.56 
In addition, an increasing number of Japanese feel a sense of "donor 
fatigue" - despite billions of dollars in aid to China each year, Beijing 
continues to harp on Japan's "insincere apology" and criticize the 
Japanese Prime Minister's annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Many 
Japanese are increasingly receptive to the idea of Japan becoming a more 
"normal country" - free from historical guilt and capable of playing a 
larger role on regional and global affairs. All these factors combine to 
cause Japan adopt a more assertive stance. Furthermore, peace and 
stability in the Taiwan Strait has always been and will continue to be 
crucial to the peace and stability of Japan. Last but not the least, the 
North Korean nuclear crisis triggered by the erratic Kim Jong 11 could 
have a fallout on Japan. For these reasons the U.S. and Japan find their 
strategic outlooks compatible amidst changing regional and global 
security challenges. The joint statement represent the latest and 
significant update of the alliance. 
However, how will these lofty declarations translate into 
operational details in the Taiwan Strait contingency? To understand how 
this seemingly ambiguous statement may actually provide a legal and 
operational pretext for some future hypothetical military contingencies 
involving China and Taiwan, one can benefit from insights from the 
56 James Brooke, "Japan's Ties to China: Strong Trade, shaky Politics," New York Times 
(22 February 2005): A9. 
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Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).57 
DEFENSE GUIDELINES AND TRA: COMPLEMENTARY OPTIONS 
In a comprehensive and updated testimony on the U.S. policy toward 
Taiwan given on the occasion of commemorating the 251h anniversary of 
the TRA, Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly asked Taiwan to 
seriously treat the threat posed by China's military modernization and 
declared that "The United States is committed to make available 
defensive arms and defensive services to Taiwan in order to help Taiwan 
meet its self-defense needs" in accordance with the TRA. 58 
Ever since the abrogation of the 1954 U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense 
treaty in 1980, as a condition for normalizing relations between the U.S. 
and the People's Republic of China (PRC), the U.S. has relied on the 
implied commitment reflected in the following language of the TRA to 
maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. 
Section 2 of the TRA states that it is the policy ofthe United States 
57 U.S. Public Law 96-8, 96th Congress, 10 April 1979. The text of the Act can be 
found in Hon. Lester L. Wolff, Dr. Jon D. Holstine, and John J. Brady, III, A Legislative 
History of the Taiwan Relations Act, Vol. 4: An Analytic Compilation of Debate and 
Floor Action Relating to the TRA in the 1 061h, 1 071h, and 1 081h US. Congresses 
(Arlington, VA: Pacific Community Institute, Inc., 2004): 2-12. 
58 James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
"Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan," testimony at a hearing on Taiwan, U.S. 
House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, Apri121, 
2004. Available at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/nn/2004/31649.htm [accessed 10 
May 2004]. 
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• to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the 
political, security, and economic interest of the United 
States, and are matters of international concern; 
• to make clear that the U.S. decision to establish diplomatic 
relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the 
future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; 
• to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by 
other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or 
embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the 
Weste!fi Pacific and of grave concern to the United States; 
• to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; 
• to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any 
resort to force or other forms of coercion that would 
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, 
of the people ofTaiwan. 
31 
Some analysts argue that despite the strong language about Taiwan's 
security contained in the TRA, the U.S. is not obligated to come to 
Taiwan's defense, and the TRA provides the U.S. only with an option to 
defend Taiwan.59 But an alternative interpretation would argue that the 
preceding section requires that the U.S. maintain the military capability to 
respond to attacks on Taiwan. It is in this regard the Revised Guidelines 
can be regarded as requiring a military capability for achieving this goal. 
In other words, TRA and Guidelines are complementary options. 
Arguments for "strategic ambiguity" are increasingly being 
59 Hickey, "The Revised,": 87. 
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challenged by the following developments: 
• Increasing concerns that China may become a strategic 
competitor or rival to U.S. security interests and goals. 
These concerns are revealed by candidate George Bush's 
talk of China as a "strategic competitor" and the various 
Department of Defense reports (such as QDR and annual 
reports to Congress).60 
• China's military modernization and double-digit military 
budget hike, combined with its steady increase of 
deployment of SRBMs or MRBMs opposite Taiwan, have 
made the deterrence function of a strategic ambiguity 
policy increasingly problematic; consequently, only 
movements toward strategic clarity can deter escalated 
military threats. President Bush's talk in April 2001 that 
he will do "whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself' 
reflects greater clarity. 
• The revised U.S.-Japanese security cooperation guidelines 
provide one additional operational option for the U.S. to 
maintain peace, deter aggression, and to, when deterrence 
fails, defeat aggression. Hitherto the options for Taiwan's 
security under TRA are either U.S. sales of defensive 
60 See Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's 
Republic of China" (Report to Congress pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense 
Authorization Act, July 12, 2002), available online at http://www.defenselink. 
mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf and Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
(Washington, DC: Department ofDefense, 30 September 2001). 
------------~--
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·weapons and training to enable Taiwan defend itself or 
direct U.S. unilateral intervention (as the 1996 aircraft 
carrier mission demonstrated). 
33 
The new Guidelines and Joint Statement not only enlist an important 
ally (Japan) when needs arise, but also fill in the gaps on how the U.S. 
would intervene in a Taiwan Strait crisis once it decides to intervene, as 
the next section shows. 
A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE? THE TAIWAN STRAIT CONTINGENCY 
An increasing number of officials and analysts believe that the U.S. 
will most likely be involved in ·a Taiwan Strait contingency. Military 
planners in the Pentagon seriously prepare for this scenario. However, 
largely due to political sensitivities, a Taiwan scenario could present the 
U.S. armed forces with a host of relatively unexamined issues that, in the 
opinion of a forward-looking study, "would have to be resolved quickly to 
facilitate a sufficiently rapid response."61 
Few analysts believe that China seeks to, or can, seize Taiwan in a 
Normandy-style invasion. Rather, Beijing's aggressive military 
modernization in the last decade appears driven by a determination to 
prepare a military option to force unification - on Beijing's terms. 
Stunned by the narrow victory of incumbent Chen Shui-bian of the 
61 Zalmay Khalizad et al., The United States and Asia: Toward a New US. Strategy and 
Force Posture (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001): 66. 
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Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan's 2004 presidential 
elections, Beijing seems increasingly pessimistic about achieving 
unification through peaceful means. 
The Pentagon report to Congress points out, "Beijing's primary 
political objective in any Taiwan-related crisis .. .likely would be to 
compel Taiwan authorities to enter negotiations on Beijing's terms and to 
undertake operations with enough rapidity to preclude third-party 
intervention. "62 
The Pentagon says that the PLA is developing strategies and tactics 
to use "surprise, deception, and shock" in any opening military campaign, 
while "exploring coercive strategies" designed to bring Taiwan into terms 
quickly. 63 The goals are to disrupt Taiwan's command and control 
system, create confusion, demoralize Taiwan society, and deny third-party 
intervention. Inspired by the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) 
exhibited by the U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf War and the Balkan War, 
the PLA has assiduously developed information warfare (IW) strategies 
and capabilities.64 
The RAND report lists other scenarios, such as provocative exercises 
and air activities, small-scale missile attacks on Taiwan, large-scale 
missile attacks designed to harm Taiwan's economy, degrade its 
62 Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's 
Republic of China" (12 July 12, 2002): 46. 
63 Department of State, "China is Considering a Coercive Strategy on Taiwan, DOD 
Says,' e-mail update sent by Office of International Information Programs, U.S. 
Department of State <uschinapd@yahoo.com> to <us-china@list.state.gov> (16 July 
2002). . 
64 For more details, see Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "China's Information Warfare 
Discourse: Implications for Asytll!!letrk Conflict in the Taiwan Strait," Issues and 
Studies, vol. 39, no. 2 (June 2003): 107-43. 
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self-defense capabilities, and demoralize its population, naval quarantine 
(mining and submarine attacks), seizing of an offshore island, and missile 
and air attacks against Taiwan designed to destroy Taiwanese military 
capabilities. 
While none of these options would be sufficient to compel Taiwan to 
surrender, the report argues that U.S. military assistance must be available 
promptly to counteract the shock of Chinese actions before Taiwan's will 
to resist begin to fade.65 This would call for the U.S. to maintain a 
sufficient and credible deterrent force in the region. 
Therefore, basing for U.S. air force is a crucial issue. As Figure 1 
shows, a 500-nm-radius drawing from the center of the Taiwan Strait 
encompasses vast areas of ocean but very little land (outside of mainland 
China). In the near term, there would appear to be only two options: 
basing on Taiwan itself, which is politically impossible, or basing in Japan. 
That would leave the air bases on Okinawa the most logical option. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
It should be recalled that the EP-3 naval plane that collided with a 
Chinese fighter jet in April2001 flew out of the Kadena Air Force Base in 
Okinawa on a mission to collect intelligence regarding Chinese missile 
deployment opposite Taiwan. The EP-3 mission was a response to 
China's determined missile buildup, which complicated cross-strait 
reconciliation, despite America's repeated warning. The asset for the 
mission originated in Okinawa. This is a textbook example of how 
Okinawa, under the new Defense Guidelines, may play an increasingly 
65 Khalizad, The United States and Asia: 66-67. 
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important role in U.S. military strategy in East Asia-Pacific. The aircraft 
carrier that Clinton sent to cool off tensions in the Taiwan Strait was based 
in Yokosuka on the Honshu Island of Japan. 
The aircraft carrier and spy plane missions are only the most 
prominent examples offering a glimpse into the future of Okinawa's and 
U.S.-Japanese security alliance's roles in regional security. There are 
other numerous daily mundane and uneventful missions involving 
American troops in Okinawa, such as scheduled ship patrols and logistic 
supplies. After all, Okinawa are a short distance away from Taiwan and 
Japan has an enormous stake in the Taiwan Strait - the channel through 
which most of its oil imported from the Middle East passes through and 
the market of two of its important trade partners. 
Kadena is an important transit point for airlift in the Western Pacific. 
The base currently hosts two fighter squadrons, two rescue squadrons, one 
air refueling squadron, one reconnaissance squadron, one airborne air 
control squadron, and a number of support squadrons.66 In other words, 
Kadena is usually a busy place, arid it is not clear how many more aircraft 
could be operated out of the base under combat conditions. 
In the longer term, the RAND report recommends exploring a base 
in northern Luzon, the Philippines ( 450 nm away) and considering basing 
options on the southern-most islands of the Ryukyu Island Chain - hence 
closest to Taiwan. Figure 2 shows the locations of a number of existing 
airfields in these islands and the associated table shows some of their 
more salient characteristics. For example, Shimojishima is less than 250 
66 Information from Kadena Air Base public website, 
http:/ /www-02.kadena.af.mil/units list. asp# 18th%20Wing%200rganizations [accessed 
13 May 2004]. 
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nm from Taipei and has a commercial airport with a 10,000-foot runway; 
the island also features a sizeable port that serves as a base for Japanese 
patrol boats. 67 Basing in the southern Ryukyus would clearly be 
advantageous for the defense of Taiwan and alleviate some of the burden 
shouldered by central Ryukyus. However, this could involve 
considerable investment. 68 
(Figure 2 about here) 
As part of its troop reorganization plans in light of East Asia's 
changing security imperatives and in anticipation of withdrawal or 
reduction of troops in South Korea and Okinawa, the U.S. recently has 
upgraded the role that Guam, a U.S. territory, will play in regional 
contingencies. By adding bombers, submarines, and other assets to 
Guam, the U.S. seeks to not only offset the loss of forward bases but also 
cope with the changing needs of new security challenges in the region. 
However, as Figure 3 shows, Guam is too far for rapid response to a 
contingency in the Taiwan Strait and is outside the range of most fighters 
without air refueling. It can, however, sustain a high tempo operation. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
REDEFINED ALLIANCE MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER 
Although East Asia has enjoyed five decades cur at a moment's 
notice on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. 69 In this 
67 James Brooke, "Japanese Island Tries to Evade Flight Path," New York Times (20 
September 2004): A8. 
68 Khalizad: 73. 
69 For a recent book dealing with Asia's three most notable "flashpoints," see Uk Heo 
and Shale A. Horowitz, Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan (New 
York: Praeger, 2003). 
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prormsmg but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japanese 
bilateral relationship is arguably more important than ever. The 
so-called Armitage-Nye Report of 2000 called for a thorough 
reexamination of the U.S.-Japan relationship in the context of the 
uncertain post-Cold War regional environment.70 The report adopts the 
view that with the world's second-largest economy and a well-equipped 
and competent military, and as a democratic ally, Japan "remains the 
keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is 
central to America's global strategy."71 
Indeed, Japan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro, has played a larger security role. Japan has cooperated with 
the U.S. on dealing with the North Korean challenge, development of 
missile defense, the war on terror and Iraq, etc. All these endeavors are 
wider than what had been strictly prescribed previously and reflect 
Japan's reevaluation of a changing security environment. 
For the most part, the revitalized U.S.-Japanese alliance contributes 
positively to regional stability and security. This alliance has not 
become obsolescent due to the end of the Cold War and the dissipation of 
the Soviet threat. In fact, it has been redefined and rejuvenated. This 
new relationship enhances not only the operational credibility for U.S. 
actions with respect to unspecified threats in the region, but also the 
political credibility for a relationship that is anchored on democratic 
systems and two of the world's largest economies. This is especially 
7° For the full text, see Richard L. Armitage et al., "The United States and Japan: 
Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership," Institute for National Strategic Studies 
Special Report, 11 October 2000, at 
www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Spelreprts/SR_O 1/SFJAPAN .PDF. 
71 Armitage et al., "The United States and Japan,": 1. 
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important as long as China's long-term strategic vision remains uncertain. 
The detractors will undoubtedly see the new pact in negative light. 
North Korea will see the pact mainly targeting it. China's oppositions to 
the U.S.-Japan defense pact can be grouped together in four points: (1) 
Alliance presumes a common enemy, and with the Soviet Union gone, 
that assumed but unmentioned enemy is China. (2) The real purposes 
for the alliance are, just like America's strengthening of security 
relationship with other allies, to contain China and perpetuate American 
hegemony. (3) With America's tacit support, Japan is ready to rearm 
itself. (4) By including Taiwan under the "surrounding area" and 
declaring Taiwan to be their "common security concern," the U.S. and 
Japan have interfered in Chinese internal affairs and have unwisely 
encouraged Taiwan independence hardliners. 72 
China's oppositions are likely to be measured for a number of 
reasons: (1) Both Japan and the U.S. have reassured that the pact is not 
targeted at any third country. (2) The guidelines are revised within the 
context of the Peace Constitution. (3) The peaceful resolution of the 
"Taiwan issue" is a stated Chinese goal. (4) The alternatives - U.S. 
withdrawal- would not be attractive, as they most likely involve Japanese 
remilitarization. (5) China itself benefits from the public good- peace 
and stability- provided as a result of U.S.-Japanese cooperation. This 
stable external environment is conducive to China's economic 
modernization and political transformation. 
72 
"Japan and the U.S. Form New Security Alliance, Mention Our Country's Taiwan 
Issue for the First Time'~ (in Chinese), Peoples Daily (20 February 2005), 
http://www.people.com.cn!GB/junshill 077 /318855l.html [accessed 20 February 2005]; 
Hamish McDonald, "China Scolds U.S., Japan on Taiwan," Sydney Morning Herald (21 
February 2005); "Keeping Their Balance- China, Japan, and America," The Economist 
(26 February 2005). 
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. 
If these basic premises still hold, it is hard to see how Okinawa's 
future can be decoupled from the overall security picture of East Asia. 
Some have suggested a demilitarized Okinawa. Yet that will require a 
redeployment of U.S. troops and reacquisition of bases and facilities 
(most likely in Guam or the Philippines - both much farther than the two 
major .regional contingencies that Okinawa are close to, that is, the 
Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait). 
However, this does not mean that nothing more can be done to 
reduce American footprints on the island. As has been pointed out 
earlier, given the most probable scenarios of future contingencies, 
including the Taiwan Strait, the marines can be substantially reduced. 
First, the main challenges require a mobile, fast-response type of 
operations. Second, the marines have been involved in many 
high-profile crimes, especially sexual assault and rape- the 1995 rape of 
a twelve-year-old girl was only "the tip of the iceberg." Third, the 
Futenma Marine Air Station should be relocated or have its functions 
absorbed by another comparable facility (e.g., Kadena) and more effort 
should be made to overcome inter-service turf war. All these measures 
will result in a reduction of those troops that are unlikely to be used in a 
future contingency in the region and greater public relations for the U.S. 
military, while not substantively affecting America's war-making 
capabilities in the region. 
For the foreseeable future, U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to be the 
bedrock of peace and stability in the region and Okinawa will continue 
serving as the linchpin of America's military strategy in East Asia-Pacific. 
During the Cold War, defense was mainly on Japanese soil from a 
possible Soviet attack. In the first decade of the 21st century, the alliance 
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will take on more regional issues - toward the objective of "bilateral 
internationalism." 73 
David Asher makes a powerful argument for modeling the 
U.S.-Japan alliance after the U.S.-U.K. alliance in order to make Japan 
"the Great Britain of the Far East."74 To achieve this goal: 
• Japan should no longer hide behind its "Peace 
Constitution" and should recognize its right to 
collective self-defense. 
• Japan should accept that the alliance has a global as 
well as regional dimension: Article 6 of the 
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty ("Far East") 
should be prioritized. 
• The U.S. and Japan should attempt to gradually 
integrate roles, missions, and eventually even 
forces. 
• Japan should join a network of pacific allies. 
• The alliance must be supported by a commitment to 
technological cooperation and system 
interoperability. 
Whether this goal can be achieved remains an open question. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that in East Asia-Pacific, Japan is the best 
-
73 Asher, "Could Japan,": 3. 
74 See Asher, "Could Japan" and Armitage et al., "The United States and Japan." For a 
scorecard on how the Armitage-Nye Report's recommendations have been implemented, 
see Hwang, "ANew Security Agenda,": 8-10. 
42 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
candidate for being the "Great Britain of the Far East," and that, if 
successful, the reward can be huge. 
As to Okinawa, in the short run, its importance as the staging ground 
for various regional threats, including the China-Taiwan contingency, is 
likely to rise. Its long-term future is enmeshed with the region as a 
whole: If peace and commerce prevails in the region, then regionalization 
and globalization will also benefit Okinawa, and render the island's status 
of as a "cold war colony" obsolete. If, however, mutual suspicion and 
hostilities become the major trends of the region, then Okinawa will play 
a key role in determining the outcome of such conflicts, because it is 
where great powers intersect. Okinawa's gratification will be 
temporarily belated but ultimately more rewarding. 
As to Taiwan, the redefined U.S.-Japanese alliance, as exemplified 
by the Revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation and the Joint 
Statement of the SCC, indicates greater commitment and coordination and 
more· military options for defending Taiwan. ·But as the unprecedented 
coordinated diplomatic warnings by the U.S. and Japan issued to Taiwan's 
Chen Shui-bian Administration prior to the 20 March 2004 presidential 
elections and referenda votes demonstrates, the ancillary aspect of the 
redefined alliance is preventive diplomacy. Precisely when the U.S. and 
Japan feel the need to upgrade their alliance in light of more grave 
security challenges (e.g., a nuclear-armed North Korea, a rising China that 
should decide to become a revisionist power, and terrorism), 
they seek to prevent war. This means that the U.S., which is presently 
preoccupied with war in Iraq and against terrorism, will enlist its alliance 
with Japan as one additional tool to maintain the delicate dual deterrence 
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in the Taiwan Strait. 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Table 1: Japan's Military Expenditure, 1985-99 
Unit: US$ million 
Current Dollars Constant 1995 Dollars 
27,400 37,550 
29,480 39,340 
31,970 41,380 
34,740 43,370 
37,640 45,110 
40,740 46,820 
43,820 48,430 
46,030 49,510 
47,760 50,070 
49,300 50,540 
50,240 50,240 
-- 51,092 
-- 51,319 
-- 51,285 
-- 51,184 
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, July 1997), p. 76, cited in Hickey, "The Revised," p. 76; 
and SIPRl, cited in "Will Japan Re-Arm?" STRATFOR.com, 28 May 2001, 
http://www.stratfor.com/home/promo/0105282155 [accessed 27 June 
2001]. 
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Table 2: Defense Expenditures of the U.S. and Asian Countries 
Defense Expenditure Defense Expenditure 
($million) (% ofGDP) 
Country 1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 1999 
United States 299,300 273,600 275,500 5.2 3.7 3.0 
Russia 225,380 82,000 56,000 38.9 24.3 13.9 
Japan 28,730 50,200 40,800 1.0 1.0 0.9 
China 11,300 33,000 39,500 3.2 4.7 4.0 
South Korea 10,620 14,200 12,000 4.2 2.9 2.9 
India 10,100 10,000 14,200 3.2 2.8 3.2 
Taiwan 8,690 13,400 15,000 -- 5.1 5.2 
Australia 7,270 8,400 7,800 2.3 2.2 1.9 
North Korea 5,230 5,200 2,100 -- -- --
Pakistan 2,910 3,600 3,500 7.3 5.9 6.0 
Source: Defense expenditure shown in $ million current from 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, various 
issues. GDP data from World . Bank, World Development Indicators 
2001. Cited in Strategic Asia, 2001-02 (Seattle: The National Bureau of 
Asian Research, 2001), 369. 
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Table 3: Japanese Defense Force 
Total Troops: 236,600 (Reserves 46,000) 
GroundSDF: 
• 13 divisions 
• 950 armored vehicles 
• 463 helicopters 
• 800 field artillery pieces 
Maritime SDF: 
• 16 submarines 
• 58 surface combatants 
• 3 5 minesweepers 
• 6 landing craft 
• 11 0 aircraft 
- • 99 helicopters 
Air SDF: 
• 368 fighters 
• 42 transports 
• 182 others 
45 
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Japan North China India Russia USA 
Korea 
Navy 
(#Subs 71 29 125 42 119 267 
plus 
principal 
surface 
combatants) 
(#Combat 80 -- 507 37 207 788 
aircraft) 
Air Force 331 621 3000+ 779 3,961 1,865 
(#combat 
aircraft) 
Army 148,500 950,000 1,700,000 1,100,000 1,200,000 480,000 
(# soliders) 
Source: "Will Japan Re-Arm?" STRATAFORM.com, 
<http://www.stratafor.com/home/promo/0105282155>, p. 3 [Accessed 27 
June 2001] 
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Table 4: Geographical Distribution of Active U.S. Military Personnel 
Strengths 
(as of30 September 2000) 
Regional Area I Total Army Navy Marine Air 
Country Corps Force 
United States and 1,126,521 378,571 312,756 143,934 291,260 
Territories 
Europe 117,411 70,251 10,843 3,441 32,876 
[45.5%] 
Former Soviet 160 34 5 96 25 
Union [0.1%] 
East Asia and 101,447 29,368 29,389 20,660 22,030 
Pacific [39.3%] 
Japan 40,159 1,787 5,496 19,682 13,194 
Republic ofKorea 36,565 27,481 318 97 8,669 
Afloat 23,352 0 23,307 45 0 
Thailand 526 39 9 453 25 
Sing_apore 411 6 85 278 42 
Australia 175 11 71 22 71 
North Africa, Near 29,384 3,477 16,556 398 8,953 
East and South [11.4%] 
Asia 
Sub-Saharan ' 224 42 3 160 19 
Africa j0.1%l 
Western 5,416 427 3,641 1,003 345 
Hemisphere _[2.1 %1 
Total-- Foreign 257,817 103,599 60,437 29,387 64,394 
Countries 
Total -- Worldwide 1,384,338 482,170 373,193 173,321 355,654 
Percentage figures in brackets [] are region's percentage of total U.S. armed 
forces stationed overseas 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Almanac, "Active Duty 
Military personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country" 
http:/ /www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanac/people/serve.html 
[Accessed 2 March 2002]. 
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Figure 1: Bases within 500 run of Taiwan 
Source: Khalizad, The United States and Asia, p. 68 
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Figure 2: Airports in the Southern Ryukyus 
Table for Figure 2 
49 
Runway Dimensions (ft) Distance from (nm) 
Length Width Taipei Centerline 
4921 148 150 250 
4921 148 180 280 
2635 82 210 310 
9843 197 240 340 
6562 148 '250 250 
Source: Source: Khalizad, The United States and Asia, p. 74 
Figure 3: Distance from Guam to Southeast Asia 
Source: Khalizad, The United States and Asia, p. 76 
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